The Lost Promise of Due Process - B.N. Rau and the Constitutional Soul of Liberty
In the autumn of 1947, as the ink on India’s independence was still drying and the Constituent Assembly laboured over the architecture of a new republic, a quiet, unassuming civil servant boarded a ship for America. Sir Benegal Narsing Rau, the Constitutional Adviser to the Assembly, was not a politician. He did not give speeches; he drafted them into existence. His first draft of the Indian Constitution, completed in an astonishing eight weeks, contained 240 Articles and 13 Schedules. It was a document of immense ambition. Within its folds, in what would eventually become Article 21, lay a phrase that carried the weight of American constitutional history: due process of law.
Rau’s voyage was a pilgrimage of sorts, a journey to the wellsprings of constitutionalism in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland. He went to ask questions. He met with President Harry Truman, Supreme Court Justices and leading jurists. But it was a single conversation in Washington with Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court that would become the hinge upon which the textual fate of Article 21 turned. Frankfurter’s warning was blunt: keep due process of law out of the Indian Constitution.
The advice was not abstract. Frankfurter, a former Harvard professor and a committed judicial restraintist, was speaking from the bitter experience of the American bench. In the early twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court had used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down social welfare legislation, minimum wage laws and labour protections. This was the era of Lochner v. New York, a period in which a conservative judiciary substituted its economic prejudices for the will of elected legislatures. Frankfurter considered the power of judicial review associated with the Due Process Clause to be undemocratic, giving a few unelected judges a veto over the representatives of the nation. He feared it would place an unfair burden on the Indian judiciary and, more dangerously, stand in the way of the beneficial social legislation that a newly independent and impoverished India so desperately needed.
Rau, a jurist of immense erudition and a pragmatist by temperament, listened. He returned to India not merely carrying a message, but a conviction. In his report to the President of the Constituent Assembly and in his subsequent amendments to the draft, Rau proposed the elimination of the due process clause. His reasoning reflected Frankfurter’s anxiety that when a law made by the State in the discharge of its fundamental duties conflicts with an individual right, the former should prevail and the general welfare should take precedence over individual rights. The phrase he proposed in its place was borrowed from the Japanese Constitution, itself a product of American post-war drafting: according to procedure established by law.
The Drafting Committee, led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, accepted the substitution. The transformation was profound. The original formulation, due process of law, was a vessel of expansive judicial power. It invited courts to examine not only the procedure by which a person was deprived of life or liberty, but also the substantive fairness and reasonableness of the law itself. Rau’s replacement, procedure established by law, was a far narrower, positivistic guarantee. It meant, in its purest form, that a deprivation of life or liberty was valid if it was carried out in accordance with a law duly enacted by the legislature. The judiciary’s role was reduced to ensuring that the executive acted within the four corners of the statute. It was not invited to sit in judgment over the wisdom or justice of the statute itself.
This was the pure form of due process that the framers intended: a restraint on the executive, but not the legislative branch. The Constituent Assembly’s decision was not an oversight; it was a deliberate refusal. Article 21, as it came into force in 1950, was a monument to Rau’s Washington conversation. It read: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” The soul of the Article, its potential to serve as a bulwark against unjust legislation, had been quietly excised.
For nearly three decades, the Indian Supreme Court adhered to this narrow, textual reading. In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Court held that procedure established by law meant simply a procedure enacted by a competent legislature, and that the validity of the law itself could not be challenged on the grounds of unreasonableness or natural justice. The Rau-Frankfurter influence remained firmly entrenched. The Court, in those early decades, was a loyal executor of the constitutional text rather than its creative interpreter.
But the text, however deliberately chosen, could not indefinitely contain the aspirations of a people. The retreat from the promise of substantive justice began, ironically, with a judgment that acknowledged the very constitutional questions Rau had sought to settle. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Supreme Court performed a quiet revolution. Justice P.N. Bhagwati, writing for the majority, held that the procedure established by law under Article 21 must be right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. The Court read the words of Article 21 in harmony with the guarantees of equality under Article 14 and freedom under Article 19, transforming the narrow procedural guarantee into a robust vehicle for substantive due process.
The irony is striking. The Court, in Maneka Gandhi, did not add the words due process to the Constitution. It simply refused to read Article 21 as a barren procedural shell. It restored the very jurisprudential approach that allowed the judiciary to examine the fairness of the law itself, an approach that Frankfurter had warned against and Rau had sought to prevent. The unruly horse of due process, which Rau had tried to keep out of the stable, had returned through the judicial gate.
The subsequent decades witnessed an extraordinary expansion of Article 21. It became the constitutional foundation for the right to a clean environment, the right to health, the right to education, the right to privacy and the right to die with dignity. The narrow phrase procedure established by law was interpreted to include a vast array of substantive rights, all considered essential to a life of dignity. The Article that Rau had helped shape as a safeguard for social welfare legislation became the foundation upon which the judiciary developed new dimensions of fundamental rights.
Rau’s visit to America, therefore, did not merely change the text of Article 21; it shaped the trajectory of Indian constitutionalism. His decision to heed Frankfurter’s advice was an act of profound, if contested, statesmanship. He sought to protect the fragile, newly independent State’s capacity to enact transformative social reforms from the potential obstruction of a conservative judiciary. He prioritised the collective welfare of a nation emerging from colonial deprivation over the immediate, judicially enforceable claims of individual liberty. In the context of 1947, with the horrors of Partition fresh and the challenges of development immense, this was not an unreasonable calculation.
Yet the cost was a deferral of justice. The promise of substantive due process, of a judiciary empowered to examine the fairness and reasonableness of state action, was postponed for a generation. The rejection of the original due process clause meant that, for nearly thirty years, citizens had a narrower constitutional safeguard against arbitrary state action than a broader interpretation of personal liberty might have provided. It took the Supreme Court until 1978 to move beyond the restrictive interpretation established in A.K. Gopalan.
The editorial, therefore, must conclude on a note of historical ambiguity. B.N. Rau’s Washington pilgrimage was a defining moment of constitutional choice. It was a choice made by a jurist who believed that the survival of a new republic depended on the supremacy of its legislature in the socio-economic sphere. It was a choice that Justice Frankfurter, a man who had witnessed the American judiciary’s excessive intervention in economic legislation, endorsed with conviction. But it was a choice that the Indian Supreme Court, responding to the evolving conscience of the Constitution, would later refuse to be bound by.
Article 21, as it lives and breathes today, is neither purely Rau’s nor purely Frankfurter’s. It is a palimpsest, a constitutional text upon which the original, cautious inscription of 1947 has been overwritten by the bold, rights-expansive jurisprudence of the post-Emergency era. The visit to America did not settle the meaning of life and liberty in India; it only began a conversation that the judiciary, in its own time, would decisively reopen.
Works Cited
Primary Sources:
-
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. AIR 1950 SC 27; 1950 SCR 88.
-
Constituent Assembly Debates. Vols. III and VII, Government of India, 1947–1948.
-
Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45, 1905.
-
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. (1978) 1 SCC 248; AIR 1978 SC 597.
-
Rau, B. N. Constitutional Precedents. Third Series, 1946.
Secondary Sources: Books and Journal Articles
-
Austin, Granville. The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation. Oxford University Press, 1966.
-
Mate, Manoj. “The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases.” Berkeley Journal of International Law, vol. 28, no. 1, 2010, pp. 220–35.
-
Rameshwar, N. Kavitha. They Created a Nation: The Omnipresence of ‘Due Process’ in the Indian Constitution. LexisNexis, 2026.
-
“The American Due Process Clause and the Indian Constitution.” Buffalo Law Review.
Analytical and Journalistic Sources
-
“A Tale of Two Judgments.” The Hindu, 12 May 2016.
-
“The Right to Life and Personal Liberty under Article 21: A Timeline.” Supreme Court Observer, 26 June 2025.
-
Venkatesan, V. “Due Process: The Clause the Framers Refused.” Supreme Court Observer, 12 Aug. 2026.